Abstract In part 1 we have discussed the role played by geographical and historical conditions. Here we wish to test our model and to estimate its parameters. Ti this effect two indexes are introduced. The geographical index is aimed at characterizing the degree of separateness of a given region with respect to the national state to which it belongs. This index turns out to be closely connected to the number of minorityspeakers; it is also correlated with the level of separatist disturbances, at least for samples having the same historical background. The purpose of the second index is precisely to specify the role of past episodes in shaping current separatist outbreaks. To a large extent, current episodes are modeled on former ones; typically this process of semi-replication appears to be characterized by a "memory" that extends over at least one and a half century. Note that this study concentrates on the occurrence and forms of separatist struggles rather than on their short-term political causes. In so doing, it follows a methodological track that has been pioneered by Stanley Lieberson (1985, the "stardom" paradigm) and Charles Tilly (1993, the "traffic jam" paradigm).
Introduction
In the first part of this study, thereafter referred to as paper 1, we have discussed the relevance of geographical and historical factors in the apparition and long term evolution of separatist movements. In the present paper we examine how and to what extent our previous qualitative discussion can be substantiated by quantitative evidence. This first requires the model delineated in paper I to be defined more precisely. In section 2 we define a geographical index that describes the degree of separateness of a given region from the rest of the country. We also introduce a historical index aimed at summarizing the region's historical record. In section 3 we analyze mother-tongue maintenance for minority languages. It will be seen that spatial factors are major determinants as has already been emphasized in a different context by Lieberson (1975) . Next we try to assess the respective role of geographical and historical factors in a number of separatist movements. Finally, we point out that in spite of the current vigor of separatist tendencies, a sustained process of economic centralization is currently under way in most countries; this process seems to be largely independent of the country's political structure (i.e. federalist versus centralized).
Before we proceed a word of caution may be in order. In making our discussion quantitative, we shall concentrate our attention on a small number of basic factors for we do not really believe in the explanatory power of high dimensional multivariate correlation analysis.
Definition of the spatial and historical indexes
How to characterize spatial separateness? In paper I we used the length of the frontier between a given minority region (a) and the rest of the country (B) as a way to assess the strength of the interaction between a and B. We also emphasized that, should there be a contact zone with another "a-speaking area", its contribution should be subtracted 1 . For the purpose of quantitative tests this definition has to be refined however. In particular, it will be convenient to use a normalized index whose magnitude will be independent of the size of the region under consideration. To this end we introduce the following definition:
Definition 1 We consider a region (a) where a minority language is spoken. 1 An illustrative example is provided by the Acadians established in New Brunswick; it is certainly easier for them to maintain their French mother tongue than it is for those living in other Maritime Provinces; one only needs to mention the following circumstances: possible contacts with family members who emigrated to Quebec, availability of local French newspapers, opportunity to watch TV programs from Quebec, etc.
Let us introduce the following notations:
• l 0 : length of the coast-line of a • l + : length of the contact zone of a with the rest of the country (B).
• l − : length of the borderline (if any) of a with another a-speaking area (A) belonging to a foreign country. Then the index of spatial separateness for region a is defined as:
w + (respectively w − ) is a parameter characterizing the intensity and frequency of the contacts of region a with B (respectively A). g is normalized in the sense that it is comprised between −1 and 1.
Examples
It may be enlightening to apply the above definition to a few examples. The following are illustrative examples ( Fig. 1) • a = Wales, B = Britain : g = 0.52
In paper I we gave a simple scale for the estimation of w; let us recall it briefly:
• w = 1: for "traditional" societies • w = 2: for intermediate rural societies
• w = 3: for industrialized societies So far we did not examine to what extent w is affected by the presence of a national borderline. Let us discuss the matter on the example of Alsace (France); in spite of the close links between Alsace and Baden in Germany, it is clear that w + (contacts with France) is markedly greater than w − (contacts with Germany) if only for the obvious reason that French is used as the principal language both in school and in the administration; while w + is clearly equal to 3 the value that should be attributed to w − is less obvious; indeed w − is much more time dependent than is w + : the number of Alsatians working in Germany, the attractiveness of German TV programs, and many other similar conditions are likely to change fairly rapidly in the course of time. Given all these uncertainties we selected w − = 1 as being a simple and not quite unreasonable figure.
The case of islands So far, we did not consider the case of islands. Our former definition would lead to g = 0/l 0 = 0. The value g = 0 is clearly too crude.
The matter is discussed in some detail in Appendix C. It leads us to the following definition. The homelands of the minorities are represented without crosshatching; the regions where the official language of the state is spoken are represented by ascending crosshatching; the regions where the minority language is spoken are represented by descending cross-hatching. The maps in the left-hand column correspond to the cases mentioned in the right-hand column; the middle column gives the corresponding values of the geographical index of interaction; the above cases have been classified by decreasing order of the index (remember that the values of this index are comprised between -1 and 1).
Definition 2 We consider an island (a) where a minority language is spoken. Let us introduce the following notations:
average distance between the ports of a and those of the mainland (B).
• d − : average distance between the ports of a and those of an a-speaking region A belonging to a foreign country.
• w + and w − have the same meaning as in Definition 1. The index of spatial separateness for island a is defined as:
where D is a normalization factor expressed in hundreds of kilometers as:
g is normalized in the sense that it is comprised between −0.33 and 0.33.
As a matter of illustration, we apply the above definition to the example of the Caribbean island of Guadeloupe which is a French territory; in this case d + = 7, 000 km; the nearest territory having Creole as its official language is Haiti: d − = 500 km; with w + = 3, w − = 1 (see Appendix C) we obtain: D = d − = 5 and g = 0.05.
Remark As explained in Appendix C, one of the purpose fulfilled by definition 2 is to guaranty a smooth transition between the case of a peninsula (which is ruled by definition 1) and the case of an island. This can only be achieved in an approximate way however; indeed it is clear that coastal navigation plays a substantial role in the case of a peninsula, a factor which has been ignored in definition 1. Such inaccuracies should not be taken too seriously however for the main uncertainty stems in fact from the difficulty of obtaining reliable estimates for the mobilization parameter w.
A quantitative statement of the paronymy hypothesis In paper I the paronymy assumption has been introduced, formalized and to some extent confronted to empirical evidence. As may be remembered, we observed a high degree of historical continuity in the manifestations of separatist feelings. For the purpose of making paronymy into a quantitative parameter we introduce an index aimed at assessing the intensity of separatist struggles in the following way.
Definition 3 We consider a region a which is the homeland of a minority; its resistance to assimilation is characterized by an index h defined in the following way:
• h = 0, if the region has not been annexed • h = 1, if there has been a peaceful annexation and no subsequent separatist claims.
• If there have been separatist disturbances, we take for h the logarithm of the total number of deaths.
Estimating relaxation times for minority languages The equilibrium phase corresponds to average stability in the number of speakers. The assimilation rate is represented by the slope of the curve. In the equilibrium phase the assimilation rate is almost equal to zero. During the transition to the fall-off phase, the assimilation rate gradually increases until the largest part of the population has been assimilated.
The evolution in the number of minority-language speakers In the life of a language 2 , two phases should be distinguished: the equilibrium phase and the assimilation phase. Fig. 2 schematically represents a typical evolution. Notice that both phases may last for a very long time. In principle one should also consider the possibility that the decline may be checked with the subsequent occurrence of a revival phase. Such cases are very rare however. The so-called linguistic revival that occurred in the late nineteenth century in a number of countries (Albania, Bielorussia, Flanders, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, etc) were of a very different nature for in such cases the language was still spoken by the people as a dialect or more precisely as a variety of dialects. The revival rather concerned the recognition of that dialect as a proper language with its own literary traditions. In contrast, the possible revival that we consider here refers to the total number of speakers; to our
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Rapid assimilation Equilibrium -1 1 * Fig. 3 Expected Relationship between the Geographical Index (g) and the Assimilation Rate (a). The geographical index is close to 1 when the region of the minority speakers is surrounded on all sides by majority speakers; it is close to -1 when that region is better connected to (alien) minority speakers than to majority speakers. In the first case assimilation occurs fairly quickly (that is to say within two or three generations); in the second, on the contrary, assimilation is a very problematic outcome.
knowledge only one revival of that kind may currently be under way, namely that of the Welsh language; still it has to be confirmed by further statistics in coming decades.
As a first approximation, the decline phase for language a may be described by the following equation:
where p denotes the percentage of a-speaking people. The coefficient a may be referred to as the assimilation rate; its inverse τ = 1/a has a simple interpretation: in the time interval τ the percentage p is divided by a factor 2.7; τ is called the relaxation time of the decrease phase. The quasi-equilibrium situation which is schematized by the left-hand part of the curve in Fig.2 corresponds to a very small assimilation rate, i.e. to a very large relaxation time.
Relationship between the assimilation rate and the geographical index g The relation that we expect to hold between the assimilation rate a and the geographical index g is depicted graphically in Fig.3 . The following special cases are of particular significance:
(1) g = 1: Rapid assimilation; example: the "melting-pot" period in the United
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West Mid South Fig. 4a The counties of Wales. The Welsh language is more spoken in the counties which are far away from the border with England, that is to say Dyfed and Gwynedd.
States.
(2) g = 0: Equilibrium; examples: French-speaking Swiss or Catalan-speakers in Spain.
(3) g = −1: Strong language revival; a rather hypothetical situation as we already noticed.
It can be noted that the rate of assimilation is largely independent of the state's policy. Thus, despite of the fact that Romantsch has become a national language (but not an official language) in Switzerland after the Second World War, its decline not only continued but even accelerated. The assimilation rate, moreover, is of the same order of magnitude or even higher than it is for minority languages in more centralized countries such as Britain or France. While Romantsch was retreating, French and The geographical index has been computed on the following basis: counties with a number of speakers over 50 percent were considered Welsh (only Gwynedd fell in this category), whereas the other counties were considered as English. The correlation is equal to 0.71 (confidence interval at probability 0.95 is: 0.01 to 0.94). Signification of the symbols for the counties in Wales: Clw: Clwyd; Dyf: Dyfed; Gwe: Gwent; Cwy: Gwynedd; MGl: Mid Glamorgan; Pow: Powis; SGl: South Glamorgan; WGla: West Glamorgan. Source: See table 4.4 in Roehner (2002) Italian preserved their positions in Switzerland; in other words, the potential usefulness of the language and the geographical environment seem to be more important than linguistic policies.
The analysis of separatism
The data Separatism usually reflects many causes, whether linguistic, religious, cultural, ethnic or economic. One could even argue that in joining a separatist struggle each individual has his own motivations. As a result, it is almost impossible at the level of an outside observer to distinguish between various sources of separatism. Our methodological choice therefore was to estimate the overall intensity of separatist struggles. To this end we converted all major events into a number of fatal casualties. In developing countries where separatist struggles often take the form of open warfare, this number is almost identical with the estimated number of deaths. On the contrary, in industrialized societies it provides an equivalent figure for the demon- strations, arson attemps, bomb attacks and other forms of protest. Specific details about equivalence factors are given in Appendix A.
The ceteris paribus condition
In a sense the fact that almost all separatist movements are taking place in longstanding enclaves is a first proof enough of the significance of spatial determinants; yet, in order to make the test more quantitative one has to make sure that variations in other factors shall not spoil the test. In other words, in trying to assess the impact of the geographical factor g we are confronted with the ceteris paribus requirement.
The following precautions are of crucial importance.
• One should compare separatist movements which are more or less at the same stage. It would be pointless to compare a situation where national awakening is just under way (as in Peru or Mexico for instance) with another where national conscienceness is fully developed (as in Punjab for instance).
• The type of the polity has an obvious influence on the level and forms of separatist disturbances. The latter do not take the same form in a nation that has a long democratic tradition or in one that has not. The above qualifications are far less crucial in analyzing the impact of the historical factor for, in a sense, the magnitude of the historical index reflects (though for an earlier period) both the nature (more or less violent) of the nationalistic movement and the response (more or less tolerant) of the state. Owing to the above arguments, we shall carry out the following tests:
(1) The impact of the geographical factor g (taken alone) is analyzed for separatist struggles in France: 9 cases.
(2) The impact of the historical factor h is considered separately first for "old" (i.e. European) countries, and then for "new" countries: 6 and 9 cases respectively.
(3) As a complementary test we examine whether the introduction of the geographical factor improves the fit already provided by the historical index.
Findings
Geographical index/separatist disturbances Part of the findings are summarized graphically in Fig.5 . where r denotes the coefficient of correlation; the figures in parenthesis give the confidence interval to probability 0.95.
Influence of the historical factor
In this section, we will see that the intensity of separatist struggles in the second half of the twentieth century is essentially determined by their intensity in the preceding century, that is, from 1845 to 1945. In other words, separatist struggles are characterized by a strong historical continuity. On the level of principles, there is no particular reason to limit the historical retrospective to one century, but the difficulty of finding sufficiently precise sources for the earlier periods imposes this limitation. Even the period 1845-1945 remains full of uncertainties for a number of non-European nations. In order to estimate the intensity of separatist struggles, we will use the number of equivalent deaths defined in chapter 6. As we will use that index in two different time periods we need two different notations: the number of equivalent deaths in the period 1845-1945 will be called the historical index and denoted by h in order to distinguish it from the same index in the period 1945-1995 for which we keep the notation d.
For this study, we will distinguish European and non-European nations, for at least two reasons. First of all, in the non-European countries, there was often a conquest phase in the nineteenth century, frequently accompanied by open warfare between the central power and the autochtonous nations. These wars involved armed conflict on a grand scale. This characteristic is relatively rare in Europe in the same period. In addition, in the majority of the countries where there were such wars of conquest, the numbers of the autochtonous population is rarely known with any accuracy. The dearth of statistical sources leads us to use an index in which the number of deaths during separatist disturbances is used straight out and is not related to the overall population. In order to distinguish these two types of historical indexes, we will call them h when the deaths are related to the population and h ′ when they are not. For European nations, we then use h, while for the non-European nations we will use h ′ .
European nations Figure 8 .10a shows how postwar separatist troubles are determined by the level of separatist disturbances during the preceding century. The coefficient of correlation between the two variables is equal to 0.56 (with a confidence interval at 95 percent given by -0.11, 0.89). The regression equation reads: We note that since a is smaller than one the intensity of the disturbances has on average decreased. More specifically the intensity of disturbances has obviously gone up in Corsica and the Jura, while it has gone down in Catalonia and Quebec. We can see in Figure 8 .10a that two minorities stand out with respect to the regression line: Catalonia, where past disturbances were too important and Corsica, there they were too limited. These two cases illustrate the difficulty of tracing a clear line between separatist disturbances and other kinds of problems. In the statistics on Catalonia, we included the Carlist wars as well as the 1936-1939 Civil War; in these conflicts, there was indeed a defense of regional autonomy, but this was not the only aspect. The conflicts between monarchists and republicans or between socialists and conservatives were intertwined with separatist struggles to the point where a clear separation between them becomes impossible. In the case of Corsica, the period 1845-1945 was marked by very few openly separatist acts; nevertheless, Corsica underwent chronic banditry during this period (on this topic, see the book by X. Versini); insofar as this banditry was in opposition to the established order represented by customs agents and other officers, it can be considered as an form of separatist struggle. However, it was not included in the statistics that we used. Non-European nations Figure 8 .10b shows the link between postwar separatist disturbances and those that occurred during the preceding century. The coefficient of correlation between the two variables is 0.68 (a 95 percent confidence interval is 0.02, 0.92). The regression equation reads:
where: d: level of separatist disturbances in the period 1945-1994; h ′ : level of separatist disturbances in the period 1845-1945. In order to determine if there has been an increase or decrease in the rate of disturbances, we can not directly compare d and h ′ because these two variables are no longer defined in the same way. Qualitatively, it is nonetheless clear that the intensity of disturbances has greatly lessened for Aborigines, Maoris, Mexicans, Navajos and Sioux.
Basic tendencies in the manifestations of separatist disturbances
In the introductory chapter of "European Revolutions" Charles Tilly develops a sug-gestive parallel between revolutions and traffic jams; he notes that like the latter, revolutions may be difficult to predict but that "once begun, they display recurrent patterns 4 "; In this paragraph we undertake the same kind of analysis: taking the occurrence of separatist struggles for granted we examine if there are some permanent patterns in the variety of their forms. The reader should be cautioned that such a study in microsociology requires very detailed historical information which may not necessarily be available in every case; consequently, our results may appear somewhat partial and frustrating. In particular the classes of separatist disturbances that we introduced in Table B1 (Appendix B) are still somewhat too broad. Even so, Table B2 reveals two notable features.
(1) A progressive decrease in the violence-level from the 19th to the 20th century, especially in industrialized countries.
(2) A high level of permanence in the forms assumed by separatist disturbances in a given country in the course of time. Let us now discuss these two features in some detail. The first statement particularly applies to the following cases: Basque Provinces (Spain), Brittany, Corsica, Indians in the United States, Maori (New Zealand), Quebec, Scotland, Wales. Here again, however, a distinction should be made between European and non-European countries. In the former (with the exception of Spain) the decrease in the level of violence already occurred in the period 1850-1945, whereas in the latter it took place only in the period 1945-1994. This observation comes into proper light if one realizes that for the period 1945-1994 there was an obvious impossibility for minority groups in industrialized countries to wage war against the state 5 . Nowadays, open warfare can only be used in tropical or mountainous regions and against rather weak states. The military defeat of the Sikhs in Punjab (1983 Punjab ( -1992 in spite of their audacity and courage was just one other illustration of that evidence.
Regarding the second point one should note that for early time periods, before 1850, only major disturbances have usually been recorded. Moreover, some of the items listed in Table B1 (for instance those regarding electoral protests) simply did not exist. It is difficult to avoid such bias in analyzing and documenting non violent forms of separatist protest. Even for those events which are on record, one does usually not have the detailed information that would be required; a demonstration in Wales for instance is not identical to one in Catalonia. For all these reasons we shall have to restrict ourselves to only a few examples.
(1) The first example concerns the celebration of the national day (labelled 2Ar in Table B1 ). Almost all national groups have chosen a specific national day, on which huge gatherings usually take place. In Wales for example the National Eisteddfod (which means session) assembles thousands of Welshmen; founded in 1450, it has become a famous national institution. Similar instances are the Diada Nacional (11 September) in Catalonia; the Day of the Basque Nation (12 April), the Day of the Jurassian People (8 September), the St Jean-Baptiste (24 June) in Quebec. In the 1970s national days were often marked by bitter street fighting between young demonstrators and the police. More generally the purpose of the national day is to serve as a vital lead and to manifest the nation's vitality.
(2) To discuss another example of permanent pattern we have selected a case for which detailed information is available, namely Brittany (France) 6 . More specifically, we shall document the fact that in Breton separatist struggles bomb attacks against French historical memorials constitute a well established tradition. During the last sixty years there have been at least four actions of that kind.
• 7 August 1932: destruction in Rennes of the memorial commemorating the reunion of Brittany to France in 1532 (Sérant 1971).
• 10 October 1973: destruction of the memorial commemorating the last public speech of general de Gaulle before his resignation in 1969.
• 26 June 1978: destruction by a fire bomb of an aisle of the Château of Versailles.
• November 1993: destruction of the ancient House of Parliament in Rennes; it was set on fire by demonstrators in doubtful circumstances.
Scotland too showed great interest in historical symbols, but used a different "repertoire"; an example was the theft of the "Lia Fail", a stone used for coronation, in December 1950.
Conclusion
Throughout this paper we have tried to look at diverse and seemingly unrelated episodes as manifestations of the same recurrent process in order to bring some kind of provisional order into a vast and chaotic field. Of the two determinants that we examined, namely the spatial and historical factors, the latter appears to be predominant in the sense that the strength of nationalist struggles is mainly set by former episodes and local traditions. But once the impact of this factor has been discounted, spatial separateness turns out to play a major role in determining the level of separatist struggles. This factor is also strongly correlated with the degree of language maintenance.
An agenda for future research We are convinced that the fundamental mechanisms responsible for separatist tendencies have remained basically unchanged since the beginning of the 19th century. This claim was given some plausibility by examining a few examples for which data were available. Yet, for lack of quantitative historical evidence a systematic investigation was not possible. In this respect one should mention the remarkable work performed by C. Tilly and his collaborators (Horn and Tilly 1986, Tilly 1992) for England (1758 England ( -1834 and also for France. Once a similar task has been carried out for other countries a systematic investigation of separatist struggles in the 18th and 19th centuries will become possible. Needless to say, in the case of South-East or South-West Asian countries this requires a working collaboration with local scholars and librarians.
The future Should one expect a cardinal change in the way people of different strands are able to communicate with each other? In the wake of the computer revolution a substantial change may be brought about by the introduction of a device performing automatic speech translation. Such a process would involve the following steps:
It is of course difficult to guess how long it will take for such a device to become widely used: 30, 75 or 100 years? Yet, even 100 years is a short span of time in comparison to the stretches of several centuries required by the process of linguistic assimilation. Such a translation device would give multi-linguistic states a chance to realize their linguistic unity much more easily that could be expected otherwise.
Appendix A: The data base
Selection of the minority groups
The minority groups documented below should be seen as a sample of a larger set of cases. In his comprehensive survey of minorities, T. Gurr (1993) listed 227 communal groups. As we already pointed out in paper I, Gurr used a broader minority concept. Our definition corresponds approximately to two of Gurr's five subclasses, namely "ethnonationalist groups" and "indigenous people"; for these subclasses Gurr's survey lists a total of 121 groups. Our own selection of about 40 cases was based on the following criterions.
• Data availability • Within the previous constraint we tried to make the sample as representative as possible by selecting minority groups from the five continents. The first criterion lead us to leave aside countries from the ex-USSR. For the same reason, minorities in Africa and Asia are under-represented. We also left aside those separatist struggles which, besides their domestic significance, have become major issues in international relations. This is for instance the case for Ulster, for former Yugoslavia, for the Kurd minorities or for Cyprus.
Equivalence factors
In order to build an intensity-index suitable for a great variety of separatist movements, we converted standard separatist events into equivalent numbers of deaths. The following factors have been used as equivalents for one death:
• Demonstration of one million people • 30 bombs or 60 arson attempts • 30 non fatal casualties • Petition of 100 000 people Except for the last factor, which has in fact been used rather rarely, the other equivalence factors are based on fairly realistic orders of magnitude. Once the equivalent number of deaths n has been obtained the intensity index is defined by the logarithm of n referred to the total minority population p:
In taking the logarithm we follow a standard practice (see for instance Richardson) which has two distinctive advantages. (i) it keeps the magnitude of d of the order of a few units which is appropriate for an index (ii) it minimizes the incidence of estimation errors.
Sources
Our data set is mainly based on event analysis using major newspapers. Most valu-able in that perspective has been the newspaper data base of the "Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques" (27 rue Saint Guillaume, Paris). It includes articles from a variety of papers (in English, French, German, Italian and Spanish) arranged by countries and topics of interest; the base covers the whole period from 1945 to present. The coverage is not uniform of course, neither in time nor in space; that kind of bias is discussed in Olzak (1992) ; by and large, however, one may subscribe to S. Olzak's conclusion that "few alternative sources contain so much information". Anyone who has attempted a comparative study based upon published reports not originally prepared for this purpose has experienced the frustration that arises when the accounts become mute just at the point where some crucial proposition it to be tested. Needless to say, we also used monographs and journal articles whenever they permitted to fill a major gap. where the "effective distance" D is expressed in hundreds of kilometers. The role of this factor is to ensure a reasonable degree of continuity between the case of an island and that of a peninsula. In particular the factor of separateness g should as a rule be smaller for an island than for a peninsula. This is achieved through the term 3 which means that even if d + and d − are very small (which corresponds to an island separated from the mainland by a narrow passage of water, as in the case of the Island of Wight for instance) the effective distance D will be equal to 3 which accounts for the cost of loading and unloading operations.
